

On objections to Ramsey on belief

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1. Bourgeois, earth-bound, essence-blind, anti-scholastic pragmat(ic)ism

How did Frank Ramsey think of philosophy? How did he do philosophy? In what follows, I outline part of Ludwig Wittgenstein's answers to these two questions and some related views (1). I then consider some objections to Ramsey's views about belief (2–4), objections which, I suggest, illustrate Wittgenstein's view of Ramsey. I also sketch two views of belief which resemble Ramsey's view in some respects and avoid some of the objections mentioned.

In 1931, Wittgenstein gave a rather definite answer to the two questions:

Ramsey was a bourgeois [*bürgerlicher*] thinker. I.e. his thoughts had the aim of clearing up [*ordnen*] the affairs of some particular community. He did not reflect on the essence of the state—or at least he did not like doing so—but on how *this* state might reasonably be organized. The idea that this state might not be the only possible one partly disquieted him and partly bored him. He wanted to get down as quickly as possible to reflecting on the foundations—of *this* state. This was what he was good at & what really interested him; whereas real philosophical deliberation disquieted him until he put its result (if it had one) on one side as trivial.¹

A bourgeois thinker, Wittgenstein opines, is interested in particular, actual cases and not in the variety of similar cases, actual and merely possible, and their essence or nature. Ramsey's interest in a particular case is a practical interest and so a limited non-theoretical interest. (When Wittgenstein contrasts Beethoven's irony with Wagner's bourgeois irony he calls the former cosmic and the latter earthly [*irdisch*].)

Wittgenstein's verdict clearly recommends thinking about the essence of actual and merely possible cases in "real philosophical deliberation". This should not surprise us. The *Tractatus* is steeped in essentialism. He there inquires into the essence of logic, the essence of language, the essence of thought, the essence of the world and the essences or natures of much, much else.² When he later comes to appreciate that the variety of, for example, understanding consists of numerous relations of merely partial similarity,³ he sometimes opposes such a view to essentialism. But in his later writings he clearly continues to think that real philosophical deliberation is inseparable from an interest in essence. The fact that his understanding of essence differs radically from traditional understandings thereof—essence is now specified by grammar—does not by itself make him an anti-essentialist.

Aspects of Wittgenstein's verdict are confirmed by Ramsey himself for whom "philosophy must be of some use".⁴ What is directly and immediately of use is useful for our relations to contingent, actual particulars. Similarly, Ramsey's condemnation of scholasticism is perhaps not merely a condemnation of mistaking what is vague for something precise but also of the origin of this sort of mistake in the pursuit of exact essences, such as logical categories:

The chief danger to our philosophy, apart from laziness and woolliness, is *scholasticism*, the essence of which is treating what is vague as if it were precise and trying to fit it into an exact logical category. A typical piece of scholasticism is Wittgenstein's view that all our everyday propositions are completely in order and that it is impossible to think illogically.⁵

Ramsey thinks that scholasticism once led him to worry about a question of essence: he mentions that he used to worry about the nature of philosophy "through excessive scholasticism".⁶ Wittgenstein, on the other hand, thought highly of the "strong scholastic feeling" which had "occasioned" his "best discoveries",⁷ which presumably include his discoveries of various essential differences. On the other hand, it might be thought that a philosopher who, like Ramsey in the last quoted passage, refers to the essence of scholasticism cannot really be an enemy of the essentialist point of view. But Ramsey's use of "essence" here and elsewhere is, I suggest, a loose or emphatic way of talking, also to be found in Bertrand Russell, who was no friend of essentialism.

John Maynard Keynes' description of Ramsey's view of and way of doing philosophy also confirms some aspects of Wittgenstein's verdict, provided certain not implausible assumptions are made. Ramsey, he says, is "attempting to distinguish a 'human' logic from formal logic on the one hand and descriptive psychology on the other".⁸ *Descriptive psychology* was the term used by Brentano and his heirs to refer to their favoured essentialist, philosophy of mind, an enterprise they distinguished from causal, genetic, empirical psychology. Edmund Husserl's increasingly baroque essentialism about the mind required, he thought, a new term: *phenomenology*.⁹ Did Keynes have in mind something like this understanding of descriptive psychology? Perhaps. Keynes' attribution to Ramsey of a distinction between formal logic and a "human" logic is not controversial. The difference between the two may reflect a distinction between essentialism and anti-essentialism about logic. In Husserl's famous criticisms of misunderstandings of formal logic in 1900, he not only rejects *psychologism*, the view that formal logic is a matter of psychology, but also *anthropologism*, the view that formal logic is a human logic. Many versions of these two mistakes rely on forms of anti-essentialism. But, Husserl argues, the truths of formal logic are necessary truths grounded in the essences, the exact essences of logical categories. The objections to psychologistic and anthropologistic views of the nature of formal logic do not, of course, by themselves entail that there cannot be a psychology or an anthropology of formal logic.¹⁰

William James' comments on the relations between pragmatism and early Cambridge philosophy point to an undeniable dimension of the scholasticism which Ramsey thought he had grown out of.

If pragmatism has any merit, it is to have rid the world of such diseased-wucherungen [excrescences] as the Moore–Russell–Meinong epistemology.¹¹

James, who had read even more descriptive psychology than Russell, G. E. Moore and George Stout, refers to "the unspeakable [Alexius] Meinong and his English pals".¹² His point, I think, is that the philosophies of Meinong/Russell/Moore are not only useless, they are unhealthy, enemies of life, to use the expression beloved of the philosophy of life. Pragmatism and *Lebensphilosophie* share a complete lack of interest in essentialism, where essences are taken to be the unalterable grounds of

metaphysical necessity.¹³ This is a point made in early, realist phenomenology:

The basic error of the way of thinking [*Denkart*] of all positivism and pragmatism is to overlook the entire realm of [...] essential truths.¹⁴

The pragmatist is someone who is lost [*ein Verirrter*] in the contingent reality of the world. He does not see the essences [*Wesenheiten*], the ideas [*Ideen*] of things.¹⁵

[P]ragmaticist philosophy signifies for us an attempt [...] to reduce all knowledge to useful knowledge [*Arbeitswissen*, work knowledge]—to display the possible modification of the world in the direction of the goals of our will as the only sense and value of knowledge.¹⁶

Max Scheler's rejection of pragmatism as essence-blind, like Wittgenstein's rejection of Ramsey's way of doing philosophy as essence-blind, is by no means an *en bloc* rejection of pragmatism. Pragmatism is not, Scheler thinks, entirely wrong. Its account of the relation between desire, perception and action is almost correct. It is only pragmatism's misunderstandings of meaning, truth and essence which have led to the "pragmaticist swamping [*Versumpfung*] of all philosophy".¹⁷ Pragmatism thus made some headway within early phenomenology but less than it was to make in early Cambridge philosophy.¹⁸

2. Belief and descriptive psychology:

Degrees vs degreelessness

A philosophy of belief which begins to do justice to its variety would be a philosophy of believing that something, believing something to be something, belief in something or someone and believing someone. It would be a philosophy of belief as something which can endure, perhaps because it is a disposition, and of something which occurs ("occurrent belief"). It would adjudicate between the view that belief may be both positive and negative (disbelief, as opposed to belief that not-*p*), between the view that it is a reaction or response to something else and the view that it is no such thing, and between the view that it or some types of belief are affective or intellectual in nature. It would display the relations

between belief, on the one hand, and acceptance, conviction, certainty and judging. It would tell us what belief's objects are. Do believing that p and believing x to be F range over past, present and future, over the contingent and non-contingent? Do these forms of belief also have so-called formal objects? Do they "aim" at, for example, truth or probability? Some of these questions are, of course, such that they cannot be answered without also determining the different roles of belief. (Is belief-that a component of knowledge-that? Are beliefs or believers more or less rational or reasonable? What makes them enjoy these attributes?) Some essentialist philosophers think that their answers to these questions flow wholly or in part from the essence of belief.¹⁹

Belief, Ramsey tells us, is a feeling and comes in degrees. Belief here and in what follows is belief-that. What exactly does Ramsey mean and is he right? A prior question is: Does it matter? This question is justified or suggested by Ramsey's repeated display of indifference about what belief really is. The question about the essence of belief, it may seem, is of less interest to him than the task of understanding the relations between belief, its causal properties, betting and subjective probability.²⁰

One claim he does make about belief which arguably *is* a claim about its nature is a claim which follows from a more general claim he makes about thoughts and the two kinds of character they display. In 1921, he says:

[T]here are *two kinds of characters* which they can have which are of great importance. A thought may be a belief, a doubt, or an assumption, etc. These I call *pistic characters*. I think that *they consist in the presence or absence of feelings*, such as Mr. Russell calls belief feelings, in connection with the thought; but their analysis is not very relevant to the matter in hand and I mention them to distinguish them clearly from the other fundamental kind of characters of thoughts, which I call *referential characters* or references.²¹

This is a version of the distinction famously made by Russell in 1919 between attitudes and propositions, where "proposition" refers to a concrete linguistic or mental entity rather than a so-called singular proposition, objective or state of affairs. In 1927, Ramsey calls the two characters of belief mental factors:

The mental factors of such a belief I take to be words, spoken aloud or to oneself or merely imagined, connected together and accompanied by a feel-

ing or feelings of belief or disbelief, *related to them in a way I do not propose to discuss*.²²

To say that feeling belief towards a sentence expresses such an attitude, is to say that it has certain causal properties which vary with the attitude, i.e. with which possibilities are knocked out and which, so to speak, are still left in.²³

An ancestor of Russell's 1919 distinction is the distinction between modes or attitudes and contents (understood as concrete, mental tokens) in descriptive psychology. Modes are there also called "act-characters" and "act-qualities" and belief and judgment, like assuming or supposing, it is argued, are intellectual and not any sort of affective modes, qualities or characters. Ramsey is familiar with this sort of view:

I speak throughout as if the differences between belief, disbelief, and mere consideration lay in the presence or absence of 'feelings'; but any other word may be substituted for 'feeling' which the reader prefers, e.g. 'specific quality' or 'act of assertion' and 'act of denial'.²⁴

Ramsey's distinction between two types of character resembles the earlier distinctions made by Husserl, Meinong and Russell in one more respect. Ramsey's two characters are wholly disjoint, as are Russell's attitude and proposition and the act-qualities and token contents of the descriptive psychologists.

In the light of this framework, according to which those mental events which are thoughts display two distinct characters, what should we think of Ramsey's claims that belief comes in degrees and is a feeling? On many views of feelings, they (essentially) display degrees. On these views, then, belief would come in degrees because it is a feeling. How, then, does Ramsey understand his two claims and is he right?

The claim that belief comes in degrees might be taken to amount simply to the claim that it is possible for someone to believe that p more than that not- p or for one person to believe that p more than another person. Then belief would resemble regret and sadness. But although we may often observe how someone becomes more and more angry, less and less sad, we do not observe a growth in someone's belief that p even while increasingly good reasons for believing that p are being poured into his ear. The view that belief has degrees has often been rejected. Believing

and disbelieving “do not display degrees”, writes Scheler in 1915–1916,²⁵ as John Newman in the previous century had asserted that assent is degreeless: “We might as well talk of degrees of truth as of degrees of assent”.²⁶ Alan White is equally emphatic:

There are various reasons for denying that belief has degrees. First, belief cannot be increased or decreased in amount nor become more or greater, less or smaller, in the way that, for example, either heat, weight, length and pressure or anger, joy and pride can. I do not believe that *p*, e.g. that London is the capital of the U.K., more than I believe that *q*, e.g. that Lima is the capital of Peru.²⁷

In Ramsey’s claims that belief comes in degrees, that there is “partial belief”, the emphasis lies rather on the existence of beliefs that are certain or less certain, firm or less firm, strong or weak.²⁸ But why should the variability of the semantic value of the adverbial qualification of a verb entail that the semantic value of the verb comes in degrees? If Maria observes Sam attentively or with interest or with difficulty, the fact that her attentiveness, interest or difficulty may grow or diminish while she continues to observe Sam does not entail that she may observe him more or less, although she may of course observe more or less of him. The distinction between the semantic values of the verb “believe” and of its adverbs (“with certainty”, “firmly”, “confidently”) corresponds to a real difference. As White points out,

What has mislead [*sic*] philosophers into the view that belief has degrees is the fact that a belief can vary in various respects which do admit of degrees. A belief can be more or less faint, firm, obstinate or unwavering, obsessive or tentative, confident, hesitant or unquestioning; it can be half-hearted or whole-hearted. But these are not degrees of belief; they are degrees of conviction, confidence, or tenacity with which the belief is held.²⁹

Ramsey seems to be not at all interested in the distinction between mental or psychological states or acts which do and those which do not come in degrees (although his reference to the view that belief is intellectual perhaps shows that he was aware of the distinction). Nor does he pay any attention to the possibility that the certainty of a belief differs from its firmness and both again from its strength.

By way of illustration, consider the following way of understanding the strength or firmness of beliefs:

[O]ne may strongly or firmly believe that p ..., but this does not indicate a degree of belief. It signifies the strength or firmness with which one cleaves to the belief one has. It is the ease or difficulty of shaking the belief in question, and not the belief itself, that has degrees.³⁰

The strength or firmness of a belief, like what Scheler calls the depth of a belief (*Glaubenstiefe*), plays a central role in an account of non-critical but fundamental beliefs famously set out by Wittgenstein towards the end of his life and even earlier by José Ortega y Gasset, who referred to such beliefs as “basic beliefs”. In such an account the firmest beliefs underlie but do not stand in any rational relations to the less firm and more or less critical beliefs on which they are based. They are precisely the beliefs some people find most difficult to shake (“I have two hands”, “My nation-state is legitimate”, “Men know best”, “God is in his heaven”). The firmness of the belief that the ground I stand on is firm is not only a typical example of doxastic firmness but also one of the central metaphors employed to describe doxastic firmness in general.

As a second illustration, consider the familiar sort of view to which Ramsey aims to provide an alternative, according to which doxastic certainty or doxastic strength is typically a reaction or response to (the apparent) goodness or badness or solidity of reasons to believe or disbelieve or to (apparent) relations of probability between states of affairs. On such a view, neither doxastic strength nor doxastic certainty is identical to doxastic firmness, for doxastic firmness is not any sort of rational predicate of beliefs.

A third illustration is the view that doxastic certainty differs essentially from both doxastic strength and firmness. Certainty *is* a feeling but doxastic strength and firmness are not. This view is best introduced in the course of considering Ramsey’s claim that belief is a feeling.

3. Is belief a feeling?

Is belief a feeling? What is a feeling? To be a feeling is to enjoy positive or negative valence. An important counter-example to this claim is sur-

prise, the neutral emotion. But let us simply ignore this. Feelings then seem to come in at least the following main kinds. There are feelings which are unrelated to what Ramsey calls referential characters or to what others call intentionality, for example, localized bodily pain or pleasure and moods (bliss, despair, *Angst*). There are feelings which are (perhaps essentially) related to referential characters, which “colour” (Wittgenstein) these or depend unilaterally on them: Wittgenstein’s admiration of Ramsey’s soul and dislike of his *Geist*, for example. Such feelings depend not only on referential characters but also on pistic characters, in particular beliefs, in a suitably wide sense of the term. Thus Maria’s admiration of Sam is based on her memory-beliefs about him. Hans’ admiration for Sam on his perceptual beliefs about him. Maria’s admiration of the British Empire on beliefs derived from reading history books. And so on.

Suppose now that belief is a feeling. If a belief is a feeling, it has to be—in Ramsey’s peculiar phrase—“directed to” referential characters. It is thus not any sort of bodily feeling or mood. Such a directed feeling, like all feelings other than bodily feelings or moods, must be based on a belief. But a belief, Ramsey says, *is* a feeling. Ramsey’s view, then, on one plausible account of feelings leads to a regress, a vicious mental or psychological regress if the feelings and beliefs are occurrents.

The view that feelings other than moods and bodily feelings must be based on beliefs is a version of what is sometimes called a cognitive view of emotions. On a slightly more sophisticated version of the view, feelings must be based either on beliefs, in a narrow sense of the word, or on memories, perceptions or expectations where these are not forms of belief. Cognitive accounts of emotions were familiar in Cambridge. Moore had endorsed such an account in 1910 and J. M. E. McTaggart followed his lead.

Richard Braithwaite rejected Ramsey’s view that beliefs are feelings: “I cannot accept the feeling as part of the essence of belief. [...] I am convinced that belief and feeling are different, and that the latter is not part of the former”.³¹

But there are at least two views which are close relatives of Ramsey’s view of belief as a feeling. First, belief is inseparable from certainty, indeed from some particular degree of certainty. Certainty, like uncertainty, is something we may feel, and has a characteristic expression. Certainty-

that and uncertainty-whether are indeed feelings. Belief, then, on this view, is inseparable from a feeling which comes in degrees, although it itself does not come in degrees. Scheler puts the view as follows:

Believing something and disbelieving [*nichtglauben*] something have nothing to do with the so-called feeling of certainty and the feelings which accompany them. For certainty stands opposed only to uncertainty (and both certainty and uncertainty are opposed to the oscillation between these and its accompanying feeling, the feeling of doubt) and believing to the equally positive disbelieving, which in turn can be certain or uncertain. Furthermore, *these feelings exhibit degrees, quite unlike believing and not-believing*.³²

White, too, was to note the affective nature of certainty:

Certainty, but not knowledge, is something one can feel, something one can induce in oneself or another, something one can discover in oneself introspectively or in another behaviouristically. We can ask *how* somebody knows that *p*, but not how he is certain that *p*; and, conversely, *why* he is certain, but not why he knows.³³

The strength and firmness of beliefs are, in contrast, not affective states. White also claims that certainty “is not the highest degree of belief, but of conviction, confidence or lack of doubt”.³⁴ A somewhat different view is that conviction is belief which is certain to the highest or to a high degree. (One may feel convinced that *p*). On both views, the relevant type of certainty is subjective, affective certainty. Certainty may also be objective, as when we claim that it is (un)certain (whether) that *p*.

Second, a very close relative of belief is suspecting. (Suspecting, surmising and conjecturing are the three English translations of German *vermuten*, the attitude at the heart of Meinong’s 1915 account of [what he does not call] subjective and objective probability.) In a pioneering but all too brief account of suspecting something, White points out that it comes in degrees—I may suspect that *p* more than that *q*—and argues that to suspect that *p* is to be inclined to believe that *p*.³⁵ Since it is an inclination, it may, he also points out, be felt, unlike belief. It is therefore a phenomenon which involves belief and has an affective dimension. (Why has the philosophy of suspecting-that been so neglected, even by essentialists? Perhaps because of the negative [White says “untoward”] con-

notations of the noun suspicion and of the verb when combined with a nominal complement, a traitor is suspected.)

4. Belief about the contingent vs belief about the non-contingent

Suppose that Ramsey and many others are right to say that knowledge is a suitably qualified type of belief. Suppose, too, that there is knowledge of contingent facts and of non-contingent facts. Then there are beliefs about what is contingent and about what is not contingent. Some philosophers think there are no beliefs about what is not contingent, that belief ranges only over the contingent. Ramsey argues that tautologies and contradictions are not and cannot be believed. Unfortunately, he says very little about this intriguing view.

One might think that his view that belief is intimately bound up with possible action entails that belief must bear only on contingent matters of fact. Whether or not this is the case, Ramsey briefly argues from his already quoted view that

To say that feeling belief towards a sentence expresses such an attitude, is to say that it has certain causal properties which vary with the attitude, i.e. with which possibilities are knocked out and which, so to speak, are still left in.³⁶

to the claim that contradictions and tautologies are never or cannot be doxastically qualified:

If we apply the logical operations to atomic sentences in an indiscriminate manner, we shall sometimes obtain composite sentences which express no attitude of belief. Thus “p or not-p” excludes no possibility and so expresses no attitude of belief at all [...]. Similarly, “p and not-p” excludes every possibility and expresses no possible attitude: it is called a contradiction.³⁷

Is Ramsey thereby committed to the view that his account of belief applies to all types of belief? In order to answer this question, it would be necessary to know whether he allows for beliefs about what is non-contingent but non-formal. For example, beliefs such as that orange lies

between red and yellow or philosophical beliefs such as the belief that to be a person is to be free or that events contain their times. Ramsey's thesis that certain types of sentence express no possible attitude is itself a philosophical but non-formal claim, since an attitude such as belief is not any sort of formal or logical relation. (So, too, is the thesis that Ramsey's formulation apparently disallows that the attitude or pistic character of assuming or supposing can qualify contradictions, can be "directed" to these.) More generally, we do not know what late Ramsey thought about Wittgenstein's view in the *Tractatus* about the relations between what have been called formal and material necessities or necessary connections.

Braithwaite did attempt to answer some of these questions. He develops an account of belief which in several but not all respects resembles that given by Ramsey:

I come to my proposed analysis of belief. And first I wish to consider belief in contingent propositions that are not known directly. I am excluding, that is, beliefs in logically necessary propositions (including the propositions of formal logic and mathematics and instances of them) and beliefs in propositions which are directly known in experience. My theory of belief, therefore, applies to most of the propositions we use in ordinary life but not to some of those which philosophers discuss.³⁸

Braithwaite's analysis of belief, then, is not supposed to apply to all types of belief and so, one might think, cannot capture the essence of belief. Braithwaite also rejects implicitly the view that all knowledge is a type of belief:

Besides contingent propositions directly known, to which I have alluded, I have explicitly omitted from my analysis beliefs in logically necessary propositions. Direct knowledge of these I am pretty clear is something into which belief does not enter: my seeing that $2 + 2 = 4$ is not a believing. My attitude towards such a proposition is more like that towards a proposition about a sense-datum: I have only to understand the words to know whether the proposition is true or false.³⁹

To see or know that $2 + 2 = 4$ does not involve any belief. About knowledge of this type, Braithwaite adopts the Oxonian knowledge-first view.

Braithwaite's view that knowledge of the non-contingent is not any sort of belief is also part of Scheler's view about the essence of belief and its formal object or correlate:

[In] believing and disbelieving, essentially what is given is the being real or irreal of a state of affairs (also of course its becoming, its having been real or timeless being real).⁴⁰

To be real, on this view, is to be causally efficacious and belief must be "about" reality just as (immediate) memory must be "about" the past and knowledge-that "about" facts or factuality. Is knowledge of the non-contingent then merely intuitive knowledge? Is there no conceptually articulated knowledge of the non-contingent? The descriptive psychologists and phenomenologists think that there is such knowledge. Judging, says Scheler, unlike believing, takes both what is real and what is not real as its province:

Believing and disbelieving may not be confused with judging, positive and negative, critical and non-critical [*schlicht*]. Positive and negative judging is also to be found in judgments which have *nothing* to do with reality.⁴¹

The contingent and the non-contingent are essentially *judgeable* (Frege's term). The former but not the latter is essentially *believable*.

5. Conclusions

This brief sketch of what a philosophy of belief might be, of objections to Ramsey on belief and of two possible modifications of his view illustrates, I hope, Wittgenstein's description of Ramsey's approach to philosophy. For many of the questions touched on are just the questions an essentialist would take seriously. It also, I hope, throws some light on the relations between Ramsey, Wittgenstein and pragmatism, one of the red threads running through Sahlin's rich and rewarding guide to Ramsey⁴² and, more generally, on the relations between pragmatism, early phenomenology and early Cambridge analytic philosophy.

In phenomenology and then in analytic philosophy, couples such as conjecture or belief & *probability*, judgment or belief & *truth*, belief or

resistance & *reality*, acceptance & *existence*, memory & the *past*, emotions & *value* received a great deal of attention. Three of the more important options were naïve realism (attitudes or modes owe their correctness or normative status to the exemplification of their correlates or formal objects), buck-passing (the exemplification of such correlates reduces to or is grounded in the normative features of attitudes) and nihilism. One aspect of Ramsey's originality is that he thought that truth was redundant, and he was a nihilist about probability relations, value and pistic characters understood in mentalist terms.

I have not attempted to consider the relation between the views about belief mentioned and Ramsey's account of the relations between beliefs, bets and desires. Nor have I speculated about Ramsey's likely reaction to Wittgenstein's description of his approach to philosophy. I suspect that it would refer to the relation between essences, essentialism and his view that there is no absolute difference corresponding to the distinctions we make between universals and particulars. Possibly also to whistling.

Acknowledgements

Thank you, Monika Gruber, Fraser MacBride, Anna-Sofia Maurin and Peter Simons, for discussion, suggestions and objections.

Notes

1. Wittgenstein 1984, p. 473; my translation.
2. Cf. Mulligan 2024.
3. A view which would not have surprised Ramsey, who refers to "the vagueness of the whole idea of understanding, the reference it requires to a multitude of performances" (Ramsey 1990, p. 2).
4. Ramsey 1990, p. 1.
5. Ramsey 1990, p. 7, 'Philosophy'.
6. Ramsey 1990, p. 1.
7. Wittgenstein 1979, 10.11.14.
8. Keynes 1963.
9. In 1912 Husserl notes that the friends of descriptive psychology and phenomenology "are regularly attacked as scholastics" (Husserl 1981, p. 20).
10. On Ramsey on human psychology and human logic, cf. Suppes 2006.
11. Skrupskelis & Berkeley 2003, p. 5.
12. Quoted in Perry 1935, p. 485.

13. On Charles Sanders Peirce's essentialism about natural necessity, cf. Howat 2024.
14. Scheler 1982, p. 409; my translation.
15. Scheler 1980, p. 465; my translation.
16. Scheler 1980, p. 211; my translation.
17. Scheler 1966, pp. 394–395.
18. In his 1890 review of Ernst Schröder, Husserl is astonished to learn from Schröder that, according to Peirce, “judgments are explained as special cases of habits of thought [*Denkgewohnheiten*]”. This is, he says, an “unbelievable [*aben-teuerliche*] theory”. Scheler claims, perhaps correctly, that many of the views put forward in Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901) are criticisms of pragmatist views.
19. The first major 20th-century treatments of belief are phenomenological (Reiner 1934; Scheler 1957), in the traditions influenced by Wittgenstein, Ramsey or Austin (White 1982; White 1993; Hacker 2004) and otherwise analytic (Braithwaite 1933; Price 1969; de Sousa 1971; Cohen 1992).
20. On Ramsey on belief, cf. Sahlin 1990; Gruber 2022.
21. Ramsey 1991, p. 91, ‘The nature of propositions’; my italics.
22. Ramsey 1990, p. 40, ‘Facts and propositions’; my italics.
23. Ramsey 1990, p. 46, ‘Facts and propositions’.
24. Ramsey 1990, p. 40, ‘Facts and propositions’.
25. Scheler 1957, p. 241.
26. Newman 1887, p. 174. Newman rejects John Locke's claim that there are degrees of assent. He identifies degrees of assent with conditional assent and denies their existence. Like later philosophers of belief influenced by Wittgenstein or Austin, he attaches great weight to what we say, do not say or would not say: “we never say that we give [a proposition] a degree of assent” (p. 174). Friends of the degreelessness of belief include Scheler 1957; White 1993; Hacker 2004; Mulligan 2013; Moon 2017; Jackson 2022.
27. White 1993, pp. 81–82.
28. Ramsey also refers to taking for granted, confidence and conviction.
29. White 1993, p. 82.
30. Hacker 2004, p. 192.
31. Braithwaite 1933, p. 142.
32. Scheler 1957, p. 241; my translation and italics.
33. White 1982, p. 76.
34. White 1993, p. 82.
35. White 1993.
36. Ramsey 1990, p. 46, ‘Facts and propositions’.
37. Ramsey 1990, p. 47, ‘Facts and propositions’.
38. Braithwaite 1933, p. 132.
39. Braithwaite 1933, p. 142.

40. Scheler 1957, p. 241; my translation.

41. Scheler 1957, p. 242; my translation.

42. Sahlin 1990.

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